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The Weaponization of Rape:
Military Culture, Tactical Warfare, and Legal Justice
War has long been accompanied by the use of sexual violence as a means of terrorizing
and punishing enemy populations; in the words of Kelly Dawn Askin, “Almost since the
existence of humankind, there has been war, and where there is war, there is always sexual
assault” (1). To conceptualize how soldiers are convinced to participate in large-scale campaigns
of rape and other forms of sexual violence, understanding the intricacies and dynamics of
military culture is of the utmost importance. Scholars have identified masculinity, as defined by
the standards and expectations of male-dominated military culture, as one of the most important
factors that explains why some militaries engage in rape during wartime. Because military
environments encourage displays of strength, aggression, bravery, and violence in their soldiers,
these factors become prevalent in the military’s construction of masculinity. This militaristic
hypermasculinity is then “characterized by competitiveness, physical strength, heavy alcohol
use, violence, risk-taking, and the denigration and sexual objectification of women… In addition,
masculinist military culture inscribes gender differences as natural and positions masculinity
both in opposition to and superior to femininity” (Weitz 165). According to Rose Weitz, these
characteristics are hallmarks of rape-prone social contexts and are heightened during deployment
(165). Due to these characterizations being ubiquitous to military culture and the fact that
military culture normalizes male dominance and aggression, Allison Reid-Cunningham argues
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that soldiers can easily become a product of this environment in which violence and virility are
prized above all else (280).

MILITARY-CONSTRUCTED MASCULINITY:
What makes a man?

While the militaristic conception of masculinity places major emphasis on stereotypically
“masculine” qualities like aggression, strength, and dominance, it is also crucial to note that this
notion of masculinity relies heavily on militaristic conceptions of femininity—the
hypermasculinity that is ubiquitous to military environments is not only defined by traits
traditionally associated with masculinity and strength, but is also defined by its utter rejection of
femininity and traditionally “feminine” qualities. In short, masculinity is defined equally by what
a man should be—masculine and dominant—and what a man should not be—caring, effeminate,
submissive, etc.
The way in which femininity is conceptualized (and ultimately demonized) in many
military cultures is a key component to this construction of hypermasculinity. Military training,
as perceived by civilians, usually conjures images of archetypically cruel drill sergeants barking
orders at young men, and, notably, using insulting language to break these young soldiers down
in order to build them back up into quintessentially masculine men. One of the key aspects of
this insulting language is the frequent comparison of male soldiers to women, most noticeably
through the use of feminine nicknames and derogatory language used against women. In her
study of rape by military personnel, Duke University Law Professor Madeline Morris quotes
journalist Randy Shilts on the particular definition of manhood taught in the military:
The lessons on manhood [in the military]…focus less on creating what the Army wanted
than what the Army did not want. This is why calling recruits…sissies, pussies, and girls
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had been a time-honored stratagem for drill instructors throughout armed forces. The
context was clear: There was not much worse you could call a man. (717)
According to existing literature concerning the use of this vulgar and disempowering language,
referring to males as females is a “typical method of ostracization, particularly in basic
training…when they [soldiers] perform poorly” (Morris 717). This effectively makes femininity
synonymous with failed masculinity.
Thus, the military conception of hypermasculinity as both oppositional and superior to
femininity combines with soldiers’ fears of acting feminine and failing to be masculine enough
in their militaristic roles to create a sense of potentially toxic masculinity. As described by
historian George Mosse in his study of masculine stereotypes in Western culture, the explicit
distinction between the sexes “was all-important in the construction of modern masculinity,”
which defines itself “against a countertype but also in connection with the differences between
sexes” (9). This feminine villainization, along with strong notions of toxic masculinity like
violence and aggression, is thus internalized by young men who join the ranks and find
themselves inundated with standards of hypermasculinity and anti-femininity—a clear indicator
of a rape-conducive environment. When men immersed in a military culture fail to see women as
equals, and rather, place women beneath them and demonize factors inherent to femininity, the
status of women in the eyes of military participants is disparaged, which may translate to rape
propensity, or at least an increased willingness to exercise dominance over women.
This is where the age of combatants is also important to consider—young,
impressionable men who join the ranks are likely to absorb these notions of masculinity and find
themselves participating in a rape-conducive environment. Participation in the degradation of
women—whether it be through wartime rape, engagement with prostitution, or the degradation
of female military personnel—is often engrained into military culture and used as a sort of
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reward system for soldiers. Militaristic power structures and reliance on hierarchy can make it
difficult for young men to refuse to participate in these acts (Morris 712). According to Morris,
“Within traditional military culture women are cast largely as the sexual adversary or target,
while men are cast largely as promiscuous sexual hunters,” and impressionable soldiers who are
unable to extricate themselves from a rape-conducive culture can, and often do, internalize this
idea of sexual predation as part of the military’s conception of masculinity (710).
In these soldiers’ eyes, raping women and thus displaying their male dominance and
aggression is a manner of proving their masculinity, and acts like raping civilian women or
engaging with activities like prostitution can serve as a rite of passage for young soldiers. ReidCunningham claims that the act of rape itself can validate the militaristic conception of
masculinity, and it functions “as a ritualized validation of a soldier’s male status and identity”
(284). This linkage between the assertion of a young combatant’s masculinity and the sexual
domination and degradation of women comes about largely as a result of the pressure men feel in
a militaristic setting surrounded by other men.
Although efforts in recent decades to incorporate women into military spaces have
succeeded in many militaries, women are still not the majority in military environments—even
the involvement of a growing percentage of women is not enough to change the fact that
militaries are still largely male-dominated spaces. Weitz argues that the typical characteristics of
military hypermasculinity, including aggression, competitiveness, and the denigration of women,
“are further reinforced by the military’s emphasis on male bonding and by the relative absence of
outside monitoring” (165). In this sense, combatants ensconced in a military environment are
internalizing and developing these characteristics to not only fortify their own senses of
masculinity, but also to bond with fellow soldiers—in other words, soldiers’ individually-
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developed and performed masculinities are just as much for each other as they are for
themselves.

HIERARCHY AND POWER:
Social pressure and age dynamics

In terms of how a combatant group dynamic translates to the widespread use of sexual
violence including rape, Reid-Cunningham speaks to the idea of peer pressure from fellow males
in a militaristic or combat setting:
Social pressure may function to spur on men’s hyper-masculinized acts of sexual
violence in an attempt to prove their manhood or to obtain the group’s esteem. Analysis
on gang rapes provides further corroboration of the role of peer pressure and social norms
of masculinity in the etiology of rape. The main purpose of gang rape appears to be
proving one’s masculinity to the group through the display of sexual violence. (284)

In this context, the age and status of young men participating in a military organization is once
again important to consider; the innate hierarchy associated with many military settings can
encourage participation in sexual violence. With older, more experienced men at the top of the
proverbial ladder, and younger, impressionable men at the bottom who are subject to the orders
and norms of their superiors, higher-ups have the ability to enforce strong social and militaristic
norms onto younger participants, and they can reinforce or encourage certain behaviors as they see
fit (Reid-Cunningham 284). Conversely, this point also speaks to the idea that military
organizations can discourage certain behaviors as they see fit, which may explain why not all
militaries engage in deliberate sexual violence. This system of hierarchy works to ensure that the
goals and preferred patterns of violence of commanders are carried out by combatants, presenting
an opportunity for those in charge to either encourage or discourage specific behaviors, particularly
rape.
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By attaching and submitting themselves to older participants (namely men) within the
military hierarchy, young soldiers become vulnerable to the precedents and examples set for them
by older members. If the higher-ups encourage the sexual objectification of civilian women (e.g.,
engaging with prostitutes, denigrating and villainizing entire groups/races of “enemy” women,
etc.), their subordinates will see this behavior as normal, maybe even encouraged. ReidCunningham maintains that the attachment of a male to peers or superiors that encourage these
forms of violence, objectification, and abuse is “a predictive factor for males who abuse women
sexually, physically, and psychologically” (284). Because most—if not all—of the men involved
in a military setting have been exposed to the same violent, anti-feminine construction of
hypermasculinity, this contributes heavily to their decision to rape or forcibly dominate civilian
women, especially during conflict when tensions are high and aspects of hypermasculinity are
heightened (Reid-Cunningham 284).
Peer pressure is a major factor in how young adults and adults within a military culture
choose to behave. After all, the decision of a soldier to rape a civilian woman (whether it be by his
own accord or as the fulfillment of a command) is just that—a conscious decision. The culture in
which military participants are instructed (and ultimately indoctrinated) plays a major role in
shaping the views and decision-making abilities of individuals, especially when it comes to views
on women; sexual violence committed by combatants can easily become normalized and be
labeled as an inevitability when it is committed frequently in an environment that emphasizes
female inferiority. Hierarchical peer pressure within the military, constructions of hypermasculinity that emphasize female subordination, and the culture of war that exposes young men
to systems of female oppression like prostitution and systematic rape all combine to explain why
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military personnel may be so comfortable or willing to perpetrate sexual violence against women
during wartime.

BIOLOGICAL JUSTIFICATIONS:
Boys will be boys?

The willingness to rape and commit sexual violence has also fallen victim to a narrative of
rationalization—wartime rape is too-often seen as an inevitable symptom of war, while male
aggression and sexual desires are labeled as primal instincts and uncontrollable parts of the
masculinity. Scholars like anthropologist Matthew Gutmann have argued that this notion of
aggression as innate to masculinity is harmful, specifically in the context of sexual violence and
propensity for rape. When rape-propensity is written off as some innate urge that is unleashed
during combat, perpetrators are given an implicit free-pass. Ascribing the qualities of animals to
soldiers also effectively removes any means of accountability for those soldiers who choose to
commit war crimes like rape and sexual assault against civilians; this view of men as having an
innate animality with no control over sexual or violent urges—and to have them awakened and
heightened during combat—provides a weak justification for wartime atrocities in which
perpetrators hold little responsibility for their actions (Gutmann, 2021).
As previously discussed, Weitz maintains that aspects of military hypermasculinity,
including competitiveness, physical strength, violence, and the denigration and objectification of
women—all of which are hallmarks of rape-prone social contexts—become even more prevalent
during deployment and combat (165). Combat zones fraught with danger and death are obviously
stressful to the physical and mental wellbeing of combatants, and, finding themselves in a fragile,
overwhelmed state, they may resort to violence as a means of sating these innate urges that
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comprise hypermasculinity—one avenue through which that immediate gratification can be
achieved is rape. The “pressure cooker” theory prevalent in wartime rape scholarship “suggests
that war rapists are the victims of irresistible biological imperatives and that the chaos of wartime
milieu encourages men to vent their urges to terrible effect” (Gottschall 130). This theory is
controversial and obviously relies heavily on normalizing and justifying inborn male
hypersexuality, but as Jonathan Gottschall notes, typical feminist criticism posed in opposition to
the pressure cooker theory has similar flaws. In his words:
The classic feminist orientation is to extend the so-called power hypothesis of rape into the
wartime milieu. That is, rape in war, like rape in peace, is identified not as a crime of sexual
passion but as a crime motivated by the desire of a man to exert dominance over a woman…
However, the feminist theory of wartime rape is also a pressure cooker theory; in this case,
however, the pressure that builds is not libidinal in nature but misogynistic. (130)
Pressure cooker theories rely predominantly on the notion that rape perpetrators are subject to
irresistible urges that must be sexually (and forcefully) sated. These theories still characterize
combatants (and men in general) as bombs of hypermasculinity detonated in combat. The
particular feminist explanation outlined above ultimately still endows men this nature of animality
and the ability to unleash these urges for power when placed in combat. The idea of a misogynistic
pressure cooker driven by gender power dynamics shares the problematic assumption at the crux
of the issue: men (particularly male combatants in the context of wartime rape) have no control
over themselves nor their urges, and there is little accountability for those who do lose control.
Gutmann criticizes characterizations of male biology as being inherently animalistic and
fraught with rape propensity, but he observes that this fundamentally flawed rationalization for
wartime rape remains common nonetheless. He notes that in cases of mass rape committed against
Bosnian Muslim women during the early 1990s, the “men in that war were said to have a
‘predisposition’ for rape that came from their inborn male sexuality,” a justification relying on this
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flawed “pressure cooker” theory of innate animality and uncontrollable urges for sexual
gratification through violence (189). He instead maintains that rape as committed by soldiers is an
attempt not only to prove virility, but also to prove a soldier’s ability to conquer any and all
territory of the deemed opponent. Considering women are largely viewed as property or territory
when it comes to not only military masculinity, but also to the demonization of all those associated
with the “enemy” in war, women are targeted as enemy territory and punished accordingly.
Gutmann asserts that wartime rape is an opportunity for men to control and punish women, which
once again relies on military-constructed components crucial to masculinity, including dominance
over women and the reinforcement of binary gender distinctions (189).

RAPE PROPENSITY:
How can soldiers willingly commit violence?

This nuanced conception of hypermasculinity as constructed by the military, however,
cannot possibly be the sole explanation for why wartime rape occurs. Recent scholarship suggests
that rape propensity in combat may additionally be determined by factors of socialization,
hierarchy, and internal discipline mechanisms, all key components to building combatants who are
willing to engage in violence. While scholars would agree that forcing men to overcome their
natural aversion to killing is a common practice in the context of molding recruits into successful
soldiers, is there a similar, innate aversion to raping within men? Elizabeth Wood would maintain
that, yes, in a way, raping and killing fall under a much broader umbrella of permissible—and
sometimes encouraged—violence within military hierarchical structures. In her words:
First, recruits must be taught to overcome an initial aversion to killing. To forge combatants
who are willing to fight, if not on behalf of the organization in the abstract then in defense
of their brothers in arms, organizations must reshape combatant preferences to allow the
wielding of violence. Most armed organizations do so initially through the induction of
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combatants into the organization through formal institutions such as boot camp and
informal ones such as initiation rituals. In many State militaries, the powerful experiences
of endless drilling, dehumanization and degradation at the hands of the drill sergeant and
then ‘rebirth’ as organization members through initiation rituals mold recruits into
combatants whose loyalties to the organization may be experienced as stronger than those
to family. (Wood 467)
Wood also distinguishes a second factor that has the potential to sway a combatant’s propensity
for violence: the undisputed fact that war can profoundly impact the disposition of a soldier and
his willingness to act violently. War can create a sense of moral disengagement for combatants,
and desensitization to constant violence can lead to a willingness to engage in such violence.
According to Wood, the uncertainty of combat, the constant exposure to—and even the wielding
of—horrific violence that desensitizes combatants, and “the displacement of responsibility not
only onto the organization but also onto the enemy, who ‘deserve what they get’ (blame attribution),
are all powerful wartime processes of moral disengagement that tend to widen the repertoire
(possibly including sexual violence), targeting and/or level of violence” (467).
A key component of Wood’s argument concerns the indoctrination of combatants and
existence of strong disciplinary institutions to ensure that soldiers’ behavior will align with their
commanders’ preferences, namely the commanders’ preferred patterns of violence. Military
institutions must then “indoctrinate recruits so strongly that they internalize the commander’s
preferred pattern of violence (and perhaps even the commander’s reasons for that choice),”
creating ideal combatants who are willing to implement leaders’ choices without question (Wood
468). But not all combatants can measure up to this ideal, and there is certainly an information gap
between what is happening on the ground and what the commanders who are delegating orders are
able to observe. In these cases, Wood claims, strong institutional discipline is a strategy used to
keep soldiers in line with their commanders’ orders. If combatants stray too far from their
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commanders’ preferences—refusing to commit certain violence according to personal reasons, for
example—a commander can lose significant control of the situation at hand. Though the strength
of disciplinary institutions varies among militaries, militaries with strong disciplinary mechanisms
have a better chance of overcoming this “commander’s dilemma” and ensuring that their
commanders’ preferences are carried out by combatants on the ground. Thus, an operation’s
success relies on soldiers obeying commands, whether for fear of punishment or out of loyalty to
the organization/cause. “Strong disciplinary institutions,” as Wood calls them, are necessary to
keep combatants aligned with commanders’ preferences, notably when it comes to preferred
patterns of violence (468).
Wood’s ultimate claim when it comes to commander-ordered violence is that there is a
clear correlation between the strength of indoctrination, intelligence, and disciplinary mechanisms
within an organization and the likelihood of combatants aligning their preferences for violence
with those of their commanders. Wood maintains that, so long as these mechanisms are sufficiently
strong, “combatants will follow orders despite their own individual preferences. So in both these
cases”— successful total indoctrination versus the use of strong disciplinary measures to achieve
preferences—“if the leadership chooses to promote rape of civilians, for example, combatants will
rape with high frequency against the chosen target, and if the leadership chooses to prohibit rape,
combatants will not rape (except in isolated instances). In short, if the organization’s internal
institutions are strong, it is possible to conclude that if sexual violence occurs, it is ordered, except
for isolated incidents” (468).

RAPE VARIATION:
Differences in motivation and willingness
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As previously discussed, hypermasculinity, hierarchy, and internal disciplinary measures
are all seemingly ubiquitous to a military environment, and it is possible to conclude that the
combination of these forces is a driving factor behind heightened rape-propensity during conflict.
But this is where the similarities and generalizations largely end when it comes to the crossexamination of various instances of wartime rape and sexual violence. As scholars such as Dara
Cohen have noted, there is massive variation in the use of rape by armed combatants, and,
consequently, the motivations and justifications for its perpetration vary. Though mass rape during
wartime is commonly conflated with military strategy, Cohen points out that there is little evidence
to support the claim that rape is always employed as a mode of tactical warfare strategy (20).
Widespread rape may not be employed tactically or commanded specifically, and certainly not
every case of wartime rape or massive-scale rapes involves a deliberate purpose for sexual violence;
Cohen claims that, besides notable exceptions like those of Bosnia and Rwanda, “rape is rarely
directed by commanders,” and oftentimes is perpetrated not as explicit strategy, but for various
motivations (20). Because of the wide variation across wartime rapes—whether the crime is
commanded or not, the number of perpetrators involved, etc.—distinctions must be made about
the motivations or degree of premeditation surrounding rape as committed by combatants.
Strategic rapes and opportunistic rapes are distinguished by their motivations. Elisabeth
Wood explains the distinction between the two, stating that “strategic rape” is employed as
deliberate strategy in order to achieve an organization’s objectives and is sometimes ordered by
commanders, while “opportunistic rape” is perpetrated by individuals for personal reasons other
than the organization’s objectives” (470). In addition to the traditional, binary categorizations of
wartime rape as either strategic or opportunistic, Wood argues for a third category—that of rape
as practice. Rape as practice is distinct from rapes committed strategically or opportunistically.
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The key difference that separates Wood’s “practice” categorization from its counterparts is that it
helps explain some of the larger systems at play within military and conflict environments: social
hierarchy, hypermasculinity, and loyalty mechanisms. Combatants who rape as practice are neither
explicitly nor implicitly ordered to do so, and thus have varying motivations for raping besides
personal reasons; most importantly, the actions of these combatants are tolerated by commanders
(Wood 471). Not only do these three factors of military environments help to explain the
motivations for rape as practice when it occurs, but they also serve to reinforce a lack of
accountability for combatants—and their implicated commanders—who rape. By never explicitly
ordering rape and turning a blind-eye to their combatants’ behavior, commanders have the
opportunity to escape culpability for the crimes their combatants commit, seeing as these rapes are
arguably of the combatants’ own volitions and not ordered as strategy.
Rape as practice also distinguishes itself from opportunistic rape in the sense that it is
motivated less by individual reasoning and more by social interactions (Wood 471). Given that the
rules that govern social dynamics within military environments typically emphasize group
cohesion and loyalty to the organization, in addition to the recurrent themes of hypermasculinity
and female subjugation that already exist in a male-dominated environment, social pressure to rape
can be quite a significant factor in promoting cohesion. Additionally, consider the fact that a rape
that occurs as practice is not subject to internal disciplinary measures to the same degree that, for
example, an opportunistic rape would be, making the risks much lower for perpetrators should
they be caught. The collective tolerance of rape as practice and the force of social pressure within
military units ultimately combine to create a virtually accountability-free way for combatants to
punish their enemy while forging stronger bonds with fellow soldiers. Wood argues that while
strategic institutionalized rape is generally rare, and opportunistic rape is usually punished or

⑭
addressed by the chain of command, the more common (and largely overlooked) pattern of sexual
violence perpetration by combatants is a “strategy authorized not by explicit orders but by ‘total
war’ or other permissive rhetoric” (471).

STRATEGIC RAPE:
Bosnia-Herzegovina and the deliberate use of tactical rape

Though rape as practice may be more prevalent in wartime than ordered rape,
conceptualizing rape as a weapon of war, and in some cases as an instrument of genocide, requires
an understanding of how rape is strategically employed. While it is rarer for ordered rape to occur
as part of intentional military strategy, it does still happen, and examining cases in which rape has
functioned as a deliberately-employed method of achieving military objectives is crucial to
accurately characterizing rape as a weapon of war, as well as identifying the various motivations
for such a command. Conceptualizing rape as a weapon of war also presents the opportunity to
hold military and political leaders accountable for their failure to take responsibility for commands
to rape, shattering the possibility of the plausible deniability endowed to opportunistic rapes and
rapes as practice. In the words of Dorothy Thomas and Regan Ralph:
Rape has long been mischaracterized and dismissed by military and political leaders—in
other words, those in a position to stop it—as a private crime, a sexual act, the ignoble
conduct of the occasional soldier, or, worse still, it has been accepted precisely because it
is so commonplace…In April 1993, Radovan Karadzic, leader of the Bosnian Serbs, denied
any knowledge of widespread rape in Serb-controlled Bosnia: “We know of some eighteen
cases of rape altogether, but this was not organized but done by psychopaths.” Karadzic
dismissed claims of mass rapes as the propaganda of “Muslim mullahs.” (84)
Karadzic’s defense relied heavily on the concept of opportunistic rape, claiming a cluster of oneoff instances of psychotic behavior—his excuse for mass rapes ultimately shifted the blame from
himself to these so-called “psychopath” soldiers, when in fact, the use of rape by Serb forces was
objectively deliberate. Once Bosnia declared its independence from the former Yugoslavia in 1992,
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Serb forces intentionally employed rape as a strategy of forcing non-Serb populations in Bosnia
into flight, and here, rape clearly functioned as a method of tactical warfare (Snyder et al. 189;
Thomas & Ralph 85).
Contextualizing Bosnia’s horrific genocide is essential to the conceptualization of rape as
a weapon of war as it presents various examples of mass rape committed strategically, all for the
broader purposes of ethnic cleansing. The Serbs’ military advantage over the newly independent
Bosnia, coupled with their desire to drive non-Serbs from the region in order to establish a Greater
Serbia, largely targeted Bosnian Muslims, and women especially were left particularly vulnerable
(Snyder 189). Serb forces would drive out non-Serb populations “by first shelling towns, then
segregating men from women and taking the men to detention centers,” leaving women to either
“fend for themselves in towns controlled by enemy forces” or be taken to holding centers where
they were frequently raped and assaulted (Thomas & Ralph 85). This once again reinforces the
gendered aspect of war and civilian targeting and reflects militarized conceptions of masculinity—
while men are viewed as individuals with endowed agency who present threats and must be
neutralized (whether through execution or forced labor), women are seen as useful kept alive only
for the sake of their bodies and the purposes of torturing the enemy, sexual gratification, and
punishment. As noted by Thomas and Ralph, “the fact that it is predominantly men raping women
reveals that rape in war, like all rape, reflects a gender-based motivation, namely, the assertion by
men of their power over women,” and this is true of the atrocities committed by Serb forces against
Muslim women (88).
Snyder et al. note that Serbs targeting Muslim women constituted the “vast majority” of
perpetrators during the Bosnian conflict (189). Their purported goals of ethnic cleansing were
motivated by nationalism and contempt bred for any and all who didn’t ethnically identify as Serbs,
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so why target women specifically for the purposes of genocide? If women constitute an estimated
half of the population an organization is intent on wiping out, why keep them alive for the purposes
of rape and torture? This is where it becomes important to understand that rape as a strategy can
be committed for much broader purposes; raping can directly contribute to an overarching goal of
genocide by taking an avenue of psychological and physical torture rather than simply massacre.
Not all rapes happen in the same manners or for the same intended purposes, and victims and
perpetrators alike differ in their experiences with wartime rape. Rape as a weapon is more than
just a single violent act; it functions in different strategic capacities for different reasons.

PURITY AND SHAME:
The various functions of strategic rape

Strategic mass rape does function in war as a means of achieving ethnic cleansing—the
Serb use of rape was a tactic clearly intended to drive non-Serbs into flight and subjugate and/or
punish “enemy” women. But the other manners in which strategic rape function also have the
capacity to physically change the genetic makeup of a specific community or ethnic group, namely
through the use of rape to forcibly impregnate women. Thomas and Regan discuss the horrific
accounts of Bosnian Muslim women coming forward to share their experiences being raped by
Serb forces, with victims recounting how perpetrators’ primary aim was often “making a baby”
and intentionally humiliating women (87). Forcibly impregnating a woman through strategic rape
creates a cascading effect of fallout in various political, social, and cultural capacities. While
forcible impregnation through martial rape serves a clear purpose in furthering genocide and
genetic imperialism (surviving rape victims then being forced to either carry an unwanted
pregnancy that dilutes their own ethnic identity, or dying either from the physical trauma inflicted
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by rape/frequent raping or self-inflicted injury like suicide), it also upholds the conception of
strategic rape as serving a distinctly gendered, sex-specific purpose that seeks to torture, intimidate,
and punish women and the very structure of their families and communities (Thomas & Ralph 87).
This conception once again relies on how masculinity is constructed in military environments, and
emphasizes how hypermasculinity is built upon a foundation of willingness to forcibly subjugate
women through aggression and violence.
Goals of genetic imperialism, according to Claudia Card, can obviously be partially
achieved through martial rape, and this constitutes just one of the many ways in which genocide
and sexual violence intersect (7). In Card’s words,
There is more than one way to commit genocide. One way is mass murder, killing
individual members of a national, political, or cultural group. Another is to destroy a
group’s identity by decimating cultural and social bonds. Martial rape does both. Many
women and girls are killed when rapists are finished with them. If survivors become
pregnant or are known to be rape survivors, cultural, political, and national unity may be
thrown into chaos. These have been among the apparently intended purposes of the mass
rapes of women in Bosnia-Herzegovina, of Rwandan women by Hutu soldiers, [etc.]. (8)
The combination of extermination through murder and forced impregnation was a primary tactic
used in pursuit of the Serbs’ aims of invasion and ultimate genocide in Bosnia. The nuances of
gender relations, however, are significant in how strategic rape can further terrorize a population
and forcibly subjugate them. Shame and humiliation are seemingly ubiquitous to instances of rape,
and it is evident that inflicting this shame on women is another primary goal of genocidal forces.
Survivors of rape, even those who have not been forcibly impregnated, are still unfairly
subject to modern narratives of purity and female victimhood. The Serb perpetrators’ rapes
accomplished more than just physically and psychologically traumatizing individuals—their rapes
carried consequences for the community at large, be it political, national, or cultural. Rape is,
according to Thomas and Regan, “a profound offense against individual and community honor,”
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and this is true of many surviving rape victims who have been ostracized and even shunned for the
violence to which they have been subjected (89). Communities may view victims as being touched
and tainted by enemy forces and now inextricably linked to the oppressor, whether or not these
victims become pregnant. Women who have been devirginized, assaulted, or impregnated can be
labeled “impure” according to various standards of contemporary attitudes towards sex and purity.
Snyder et al. assert that rape “as a moral attack against women is especially devastating within
southeastern European cultures, where female chastity is central to family and community honor”
(190). By destroying the fabric of gender and sex relations within a population through martial
rape, perpetrators can thus effect chaos and moral upheaval to terrorize and ultimately destroy the
social bonds of a particular population. As noted by Snyder et al.,
In this regard, the mass war rapes can be understood as an element of communication—the
symbolic humiliation of the male opponent. By dishonoring a woman’s body, which
symbolizes her lineage, a man can symbolically dishonor the whole lineage. On a larger
scale within the context of war, the concept of lineage extends to the entire ethnic group or
culture. Thus, sexual violence against women became a tool of genocide for destroying the
enemy’s honor, lineage, and nation. (190)
In the case of Bosnia and other genocides involving mass rape, rape serves a strategic function not
only to achieve genetic imperialism through forcible impregnation, but also to foist shame and
humiliation onto communities as well as victims, disrupting the unity of a population whose
stability is already at great risk.
Shame is not only a mechanism of instigating community upheaval, but also a factor that
keeps many female victims quiet about their assaults, and consequently decreases the
accountability perpetrators and commanders face. Women who are raped face social consequences
for being raped, including the shame and dishonor that accompany being sexually assaulted. In
fearing for their reputations, their health, and their community bonds, women who have been raped
may not come forward to report their rapes for fear of risking social upheaval, familial dishonor,
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and ostracism. Thomas and Regan observe that, “By virtue of being a rape victim, a woman
becomes the perceived agent of her community’s shame. In a bizarre twist, she changes from a
victim into a guilty party, responsible for bringing dishonor upon her family or community. As a
result, women victims, whether for fear of being seen this way, or because they see themselves
this way, are extremely reluctant to report rape” (90).
Rape is not only a tool used to effect genocidal goals, but also a mechanism of foisting
shame and cultural/social/familial dishonor upon a community on a major scale. The pregnancies
that result from rape, whether the baby is kept or not (though many women under Serb domination
who were forcibly impregnated were imprisoned until abortion methods would be too late to be
effective), can evidently result in major negative impacts for the social and cultural makeup of an
entire group, breeding contempt for victims. Pregnancies also fractionalize groups by creating an
entirely distinct generation of individuals born from rape and thus associated with the opponent or
oppressor, plunging a community further into chaos and ensuring that the impacts of mass rape are
felt for generations to come. Strategic commands for mass rape and widespread sexual violence as
a part of total war against the Bosnian Muslim population were willingly carried out by combatants
in Bosnia-Herzegovina in order to systematically terrorize and eliminate; though scholarship
suggests that ordered rape is significantly less common than rape as practice or opportunistic rape
in combat, it nonetheless remains an ultimately real and pressing issue. At its core, ordered rape
relies on key pillars of hypermasculinity as constructed by the military, including hierarchical
dynamics, peer pressure, violence, and a focus on dominating and punishing women. Studying
deliberate, ordered mass rape is essential to understanding how social and gender dynamics in
military cultures mold combatants into participants who are willing to carry out horrific orders for
various reasons, including misogynistic or ethnic motivations.

⑳

GENOCIDAL RAPE:
Rwanda’s genocide and the sexual violence targeting women
During the same decade of the events of Bosnia’s genocide and the deliberate use of rape
by Serb forces to engender political goals, the African nation of Rwanda faced its own genocide:
the deliberate extermination of the minority Tutsi populations by the Hutu majority. During the
Hutus’ ethnically motivated massacre in 1994, between 800,000 and one million individuals
were murdered, and it is estimated that between 250,000 and 500,000 women were raped (UN,
Mullins 3). The use of rape by Hutu forces against Tutsi women was orchestrated and
overwhelmingly deliberate. In the words of Christopher Mullins, the violence experienced by
rape victims in Rwanda “was not simply a ‘pressure-cooker’ release,” but rather, “a core tool of
the genocide itself. These events were neither spontaneous nor scattered, but systematic. They
served to keep Tutsi populations in terror and served as a constant reminder of the totally
debased state which Tutsis now occupied” (21). But how were Hutu soldiers able to commit such
atrocities so willingly, so broadly, and with so much passion?
Ethnic tensions, like those in the Bosnian genocide during the same period, were
significant motivators in the genocide against Tutsis in Rwanda, but what distinguishes the Hutu
forces’ willingness to rape from their Serb counterparts is that aspects of their ethnic tensions
were inherently sexualized. Because the Tutsi population was historically considered a somewhat
aristocratic minority, the Hutus, albeit a much larger, dominant population, “were enraged over
their lower status and resented the supposed Tutsi beauty and arrogance,” and sought retribution.
Tutsi women especially were targeted not only because of their ethnicity, but also their sex; the
typical narrative cited by Hutu men surrounding Tutsi women entailed Tutsi women being
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arrogant “sexual deviants” who would attempt to seduce and steal Hutu men from their
respective community (Mullins 6). According to Donatilla Mukamana and Petra Brysiewicz, the
genocide relied in part on the mythical stories surrounding Tutsi women, that they were
“sexually sweeter than Hutu women” (381). Rapes motivated by these myths and stereotypes
were “a form of revenge against those women they would not have had access to in the past and
thus it was also an act of revenge toward the entire community” (Mukamana & Brysiewicz 381).
This attitude was largely held by Hutu forces, who internalized their hatred of Tutsi women
(whether for ethnic reasons or for specifically sexual reasons related to ethnicity) and exacted
genocide through not only mass slaughter, but also mass rape.
As in the case of Bosnia, inspiring widespread fear and shame was a prevalent function of
strategic rape in Rwanda as well. Mass rape spells out chaos for the social bonds of a
community, as was evidenced in the Serbs’ motivations for widespread sexual violence;
denigration and identity spoilage, as noted by Mullins, are key motivations to commit genocidal
rape, as they build on the strong patriarchal structures already in place in many societies and
ensure that raped women are no longer fit for society or marriage (6). The same goes for forced
impregnation as a part of the endured rape, as it functions as an even more permanent mark of
ostracism and “contamination” by enemy forces—it is also worth noting once again that forced
impregnation is an inherently gendered attack that likely reflects vital aspects of military
hypermasculinity, including violence against women and the forcible subjugation of women.
According to Mullins, rape and forced impregnation serve three major functions:
First, [forced impregnation] provides a long-lasting reminder of the humiliation and
derogation of the people as whole…Second, as the children and their mothers are often
outcasts from their kin groups because of the assaults themselves, this enhances the social
disorganization of villages and cities…Thirdly, in societies where lineage membership is
determined via patrilineal parentage, the children in question are members of the father’s
and not the mother’s ethnic group. In effect, this can change the symbolic ethnic group
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membership of a community and further work towards the elimination of a
population….(6)
The inherently gendered attacks on Tutsi women by Hutu forces achieved genocidal motivations
by weaponizing shame against a minority community, as well as creating a distinct sect of
“mixed” or multiethnic children that would emphasize disunity and ethnic/cultural disintegration
within the targeted community, ensuring that shame from rape follows victims and community
members for generations after their attacks.

MOTIVES AND COMMANDS:
Humiliation, revenge, and legal justice

Terrorizing the Tutsi population through shame did not stop at archetypical instances of
rape and forced impregnation, however. Hutu forces were creative in their means of genocidal
torture, and shame is a crucial tactic used to keep victims quiet and perpetrators unaccountable.
The circumstances of some instances of rape in Rwanda were intended to attack the cultural
morals of Tutsi women and inflict irreparable psychological damage onto them; there are
countless sickening accounts of women being raped in front of family members, gang-rapes,
adult women being raped by children, forced devirginization, and sexual organ mutilation. The
deliberate spreading of HIV was also used as a tool to subjugate and inflict terror upon Tutsi
women, and the contagious nature of the virus virtually guaranteed that victimized women would
remain segregated and “othered” in their communities (Mukamana & Brysiewicz 382). Social
isolation is a major consequence of genocidal rape that, should victims survive their attacks
(which many did not due to the extreme violence exhibited by Hutu forces), has the ability to
easily tear the social and familial fabric of a community.
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Desires to humiliate, to exact revenge, and to inflict physical trauma, psychological
damage, and even death onto Tutsi women could be considered the major functions of genocidal
rape as utilized by Hutu forces in Rwanda. Combatants’ willingness to commit mass rape was
evidently tied to their notions of ethnic and gendered superiority, the perceived sexual status of
Tutsi women, and a desire to not only punish the enemy but also to prove virility and dominance.
What distinguishes the Hutus’ rapes from those of passion-driven opportunistic rapes and widely
practiced, unacknowledged rapes is the fact that many combatants received explicit orders to
rape from their commanders; many local leaders and commanders were not turning a blind-eye
to their combatants’ sexual violence nor were they discouraging it—in fact, many leaders bluntly
ordered crusades of rape and sexual torture.
Notions and myths about Tutsi women’s sexual appeal and promiscuity were among the
many significant factors driving orders for rape. The prosecutions of individuals who sanctioned
sexual violence following the genocide at international tribunals reveal not only the Hutus’
motivations to rape, but also how these orders were given, received, and committed. The former
mayor of Taba, Jean-Paul Akayesu, was the first individual convicted by an international court
for genocide, as well as for rape as a crime against humanity in 1998, over four years after the
violence occurred (ICD). Akayesu’s trial presented multiple examples of his orders for rape and
sexual violence. In one instance, he told his assembled men to make certain that they slept with
certain women whom they humiliated, and in others, he “would demand men under his control
commit rape, saying, ‘[y]ou can never tell me now you do not know what Tutsi women taste
like’” (Mullins 13). Akayesu’s case was the first in which rape was defined by an international
court as an international crime, as well as the first recognition of mass rape as a means of
enacting genocide (USHMM).
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Instances of commanders ordering rape were not rare in the Rwandan genocide. In
addition to Akayesu, other notable leaders and military officials deliberately sanctioned
weaponized rape. Scores of women have come forward in the years following the genocide to
share their experiences and testify against their rapists, and though their stories have resulted in
the prosecution of notable perpetrators, many raped women are still confined to quiet victimhood
and lost hope for justice as a result of the shame and humiliation that follows rape. Wartime rape
has an undoubtedly massive impact on the lives and communities of victims post-conflict, but
strategic rape especially has major negative consequences that live on and continue to destroy
individuals, sometimes even entire communities, including forced pregnancy, scores of assaulted
women being deemed impure and thus unable to be married or live freely, and sociocultural
fractionalization.

DISCUSSION

Rape functions in several distinct strategic capacities, making it a powerful weapon of
war and terror. Specifically, when it comes to achieving goals of genocide or ethnic cleansing,
rape is a significant tool in effecting the extermination of an ethnic group. As illustrated in the
genocides of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Rwanda in the 1990s, strategic rape that is ordered from
top-tier authorities and carried out by combatants was utilized as a mode of tactical warfare that
inspired widespread terror, dehumanized and humiliated the perceived enemy, and ultimately
forcibly changed the genetic makeup of ethnic minority groups. Forced impregnation, the
intentional transfer of sexually transmitted diseases, and genital mutilation are all functions of
rape that are inherently sexual in nature. Their use in a tactical setting distinguishes these rapes
from rapes driven by lust or purportedly uncontrollable sexual urges because, though the crimes
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are innately sexual, they are largely motivated by attitudes of dominance and a desire to punish
the enemy. These motivations, along with attitudes of competitiveness, violence, and female
subordination, combine to create key pillars of military-constructed hypermasculinity.
Militaries themselves are not the issue when it comes to possible avenues of eradicating
wartime rape. Rather, the way in which many male-dominated militaries indoctrinate and mold
their recruits in order to force their alignment with the organization's preferences and goals is
both a dangerous and imminent matter. Wartime rape is an issue of leadership. In training
soldiers to harness traits of hypermasculinity like violence and male dominance, militaries
instruct and consequently construct loyal combatants who are willing to carry out ordered
atrocities, even if those orders are to rape and commit widespread sexual violence. The age and
impressionability of combatants, as well as their indoctrinated passion for the organization’s
cause, combine to create combatants who are loyal to the hierarchical systems at play in military
contexts. If strong leaders command soldiers to rape, soldiers will rape. This is an inherently
systemic issue that concerns deeply-ingrained patriarchal views and an emphasis on using
violence and terror to punish the enemy, factors that appear seemingly ubiquitous to the
hypermasculinity prescribed by military environments and hierarchy.
There are vast variations across instances of wartime rape, including strategic rape.
Individual and group motivations for raping, willingness to commit ordered rape, and
perpetrators and victims alike vary widely—it is worth noting that not all wartime or strategic
rape victims are women, nor are all perpetrators male. The inherently gendered nature of war,
however, coupled with the patriarchal standards and social dynamics within many societies, has
the capacity to normalize or in some ways mandate male-on-female violence. Certain sexual
crimes within mass rape, as evidenced in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Rwanda, were inherently
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gendered, the most notable being forced pregnancy. Military-constructed hypermasculinity
positions itself as opposite and superior to femininity, and this becomes increasingly apparent
when civilian women are attacked specifically because of their gender (Weitz 165).
Excuses for wartime rape, though often weak, nonetheless persist as common
understandings of why soldiers commit sexual violence. The idea that combatants are unleashed
and give in to their violent urges within a ‘pressure cooker’ environment, as well as the notion
that all men have a predisposition for rape born from an innate animality, are not adequate
explanations for why wartime rape occurs, nor can these theories justify the actions and
conscious decisions of perpetrators. Although rape used as a weapon of war is not as common as
its randomly or opportunistically practiced counterparts, it does still exist and present a threat to
the safety of all women involved or associated with war. Rape goes beyond an isolated act of
humiliation and violence—strategic rape can engender genocide, psychologically damage entire
populations, and subjugate targeted groups. Instead of justifying rape as an inevitable side-effect
of war and allowing perpetrators to remain unaccountable, prosecuting rape as a crime against
humanity and a factor of genocide can set a precedent for justice. Though strategic rapes are
often intended to shame victims into silence, those victims who do step forward to share their
stories can engender justice not only in the international legal sphere, but also in their personal
lives. Until those who command and perpetrate rape are held unequivocally accountable for their
crimes, wartime rape may continue to terrorize generations of women and communities whilst
still being viewed as an unfixable symptom of war.
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